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*SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
    
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.) 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 08-cv-1500) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joy Flowers Conti  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2012 
 
Before:   FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 





JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 William Prosdocimo appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania denying his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas 
relief from a state murder conviction.  Prosdocimo argues that his petition should have 
been granted because his constitutional right to due process was violated when the 
prosecutor at his trial failed to correct a witness‟s allegedly false testimony.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Factual Background And Procedural History 
 A. Factual Background 
 Prosdocimo was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Thomas 
Sacco, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment.  At his trial, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania called Charles Kellington to testify that Prosdocimo had 
arranged for Miles Gabler to shoot Sacco.  To discredit Kellington, Prosdocimo called 
Gabler as a witness.  Gabler admitted to killing Sacco, but claimed that he had been paid 
to kill Sacco by Kellington and that he did not know Prosdocimo at the time.  Gabler 
further testified that he had apprised Charles Rossi of his plan to kill Sacco, and arranged 
for Rossi to drive him to the location where he shot Sacco.  Seeking to refute Gabler‟s 
testimony, the Commonwealth called Rossi as a witness on rebuttal.  Contradicting 
Gabler, Rossi testified that he had no advance knowledge that Sacco was to be killed and 
that he did not serve as Gabler‟s driver on the night in question.   
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 On direct examination, Rossi stated that he had entered into a “plea bargain with 
the District Attorney‟s Office of Pennsylvania and the United States Government.”  (J.A. 
at 435.)  Among other things, the agreement required Rossi to provide information 
concerning the deaths of Sacco, Norman McGregor, and Melvin Pike, and to plead guilty 
to violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute, for 
which he would serve a 20-year term of incarceration.  In exchange for Rossi‟s 
cooperation, the plea bargain stated that the information Rossi provided would not be 
used against him by the United States or the Commonwealth “in any prosecution relating 
to any matters,” other than the RICO charge.  (J.A. at 65.) 
 During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Rossi about his involvement 
in the McGregor and Pike murders:  
 Q: Where were those pleas entered, sir? 
A: In the Ricco [sic] – is that what you are talking about, the Ricco 
[sic]? 
 Q: Yes, which court? 
 A: Oh, that was in the Federal Court, yes, from a Judge Simmons. 
 Q: Which two murders did you plead to, sir? 
A: The Pike murder in Washington County and the McGregor murder 
in Allegheny County. 
Q: You said the Pike murder.  Are you referring to one Melvin Pike? 
A: That‟s correct. 
Q: When you say the McGregor murder, are you referring to one 
Norman McGregor? 
A: That‟s correct. 
Q: In the Pike murder, sir, were you actually the killer? 
A: No. 
Q: And in the McGregor murder, were you actually the killer? 
A: No. 
Q: But you fully admitted to participating in the acts that led to the 
death of those two men? 
A: I do. 
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(J.A. at 436-37.)  On cross-examination, Prosdocimo asked Rossi to elaborate on his 
acknowledged involvement in the McGregor and Pike murders, seeking to ascertain 
whether Rossi was immune from prosecution for those murders: 
Q: Now, sir, you have told us that you have pled guilty in Federal Court 
to a racketeering statute, and the basis or predicate for that was two 
murders.  Is that correct? 
A: That‟s true. 
Q: And have you received immunity from the Federal Government? 
A: Immunity? 
Q: Yes, from prosecution to other crimes that you are testifying about.  
In other words, have you been granted immunity by the Federal 
Government? 
A: Well, there is an immunity, from what I understand, on the one 
crime, and that‟s the Mitchell case. 
Q: Has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania granted you immunity 
against the use of your testimony or your own words which you may 
speak in court or in interviews so that they won‟t be used against you 
in any subsequent prosecution of you? 
A: Not that I know of.  It‟s never been brought up to me. 
Q: Has there been any promises made to you by [the prosecuting 
attorney] or anybody from the District Attorney‟s Office that you 
wouldn‟t be prosecuted in the State of Pennsylvania with 
Mr. McGregor‟s murder? 
A: No, none that I know of. 
Q: Have there been any promises made by the State of Pennsylvania or 
any county that you will not be prosecuted for the murder of 
Mr. Pike? 
A: Not that I know of. 
Q: Well, as you are sitting here today do you expect to be prosecuted 
for the murder of Norman McGregor? 
A: Not the way I understand it.  The way I understand it, the Ricco [sic] 
Act covers my prosecution on the Pike and McGregor case. 
Q: Okay, but here you are sitting here today telling us that somebody 
told you that you won‟t be prosecuted for your murder of Norman 
McGregor.  Is that correct? 
A: No, I didn‟t say that, you said that…. 
Q: Mr. Rossi, have you entered into an agreement with the authorities 
from Washington County or anyplace in the State of Pennsylvania 
that you will not be prosecuted for the murder of Melvin Pike? 
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A: I haven‟t talked to anyone from Washington County.  Like I 
explained to you before, sir, the only thing I know with regard to the 
Pike and McGregor case is that those two murders I pled guilty 
under the Ricco [sic] Act, and it was my understanding that that 
covered that. 
Q: Okay, so the answer to the question that I am asking you is no, that 
no one made any promises.  Is that correct? 
A: That‟s correct. 
(J.A. at 440-43.)  The Commonwealth did not, at any point, clarify that the plea 
agreement in fact immunized Rossi from a Commonwealth prosecution for the McGregor 
and Pike murders, and the jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict against Prosdocimo.   
 B. Procedural History 
 After his trial concluded, Prosdocimo filed post-verdict motions challenging his 
conviction.  By then, a copy of Rossi‟s plea agreement had come to light,1 and, in the 
briefing in support of the post-trial motions, Prosdocimo argued that his conviction 
should be reversed because the prosecutor failed to correct Rossi‟s “deliberate[ ] … lie” 
regarding the scope of his plea agreement.  (J.A. at 82.)  The trial court rejected that 
argument, reasoning that Prosdocimo had waived it by raising it only in his briefing and 
not in the post-verdict motions themselves.  Prosdocimo appealed to the Superior Court, 
which likewise deemed the issue waived.  He then raised the argument a final time on 
                                              
1
 Prosdocimo was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.  
Although the Allegheny County District Attorney and the Attorney General for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were signatories to Rossi‟s plea agreement, it appears 
that the prosecuting attorney in Prosdocimo‟s trial was unaware of the scope of the plea 
agreement‟s immunity with respect to the McGregor and Pike murders.  During a sidebar 
conference, the prosecutor informed the judge that “we didn‟t make any agreement 
because it was our understanding the basis for the [RICO] plea is the murder, and that 
you could not prosecute him for something he pled to in Federal Court.”  (J.A. at 445-46.)  
Defense counsel, likewise, was unaware of the plea agreement because the 
Commonwealth apparently never turned it over during discovery.   
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direct appeal, in an unsuccessful petition for discretionary review by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.   
 Thereafter, Prosdocimo collaterally attacked his conviction in state court by filing 
a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”).  Among other claims, 
Prosdocimo‟s petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 
raise the claim concerning Rossi‟s allegedly false testimony in a post-verdict motion.   
The PCHA court rejected that claim, cursorily stating that the allegedly false statements 
were “accepted by the jury after thorough cross-examination” and that the claim was 
meritless because “[n]o independent evidence of perjury [was] offered … .”  (J.A. at 
315.)  Prosdocimo appealed that decision to the Superior Court, which agreed with the 
PCHA Court that “all of the issues which had not been finally litigated on their merits 
plainly lack merit, and so counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise 
them.”  (J.A. at 369.)  Prosdocimo‟s ensuing petition for discretionary review by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied without explanation.   
 Prosdocimo next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  His petition was referred to a 
Magistrate Judge, who recommended that it be dismissed.  On December 14, 2010, the 
District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation, over Prosdocimo‟s 
objections.  The Court dismissed Prosdocimo‟s petition and declined to issue a certificate 
of appealability.   
This timely appeal followed.  We granted a certificate of appealability as to the 
sole issue of whether Prosdocimo‟s constitutional right to due process was violated by the 
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Commonwealth‟s use of, and failure to correct, the testimony of Charles Rossi relating to 




Prosdocimo argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor‟s 
failure to correct Rossi‟s testimony violated his right to due process.   
Although the parties contest whether Prosdocimo properly exhausted that claim in 
state court,
3
 they agree that, to the extent he did, review in this Court is limited by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).  They further agree 
that, employing the standard articulated in AEDPA, we should assess whether the PCHA 
court‟s determination that Prosdocimo‟s due process claim is meritless “was contrary to, 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Prosdocimo‟s petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, 
and “review[] [the] District Court‟s denial of habeas corpus relief de novo.”  Vega v. 
United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
3
 The Commonwealth argues that Prosdocimo‟s claim was not properly exhausted.  
Prosdocimo responds that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied in this case because the 
PCHA court was presented with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that it rejected 
by reference to the merits of the separate, underlying due process claim raised in 
Prosdocimo‟s federal habeas petition.  Some courts have accepted Prosdocimo‟s 
reasoning, see Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 409 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Even though 
the [Petitioner‟s due process] claim appeared under the heading of ineffective assistance 
of counsel,” the due process claim was properly exhausted and the state court‟s decision 
that the underlying claim had no merit was reviewed under § 2254(d)(1)); Veal v. Myers, 
326 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (concluding that, when the state court has 
discussed the merits of a habeas petitioner‟s claim, a holding that he or she failed to 
exhaust those claims would not accord with the principle of deference to state decisions 
that is articulated in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act), but we need not 
express an opinion on the issue of exhaustion because it is apparent that Prosdocimo‟s 
claim fails on the merits, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 
exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). 
 8 
 
or … an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  It is undisputed that 
the PCHA court‟s determination is the relevant decision for AEDPA purposes, see Bond 
v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that our review under 
§ 2254(d)(1) extends to the state decision that either “represents the state courts‟ last 
reasoned opinion on th[e] topic or has not been supplemented in a meaningful way by the 
higher state court”); cf. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011) (holding that “clearly 
established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) is that in effect at the time of the state court 
adjudication on the merits), and we accept the parties‟ invitation to review that decision 
under AEDPA‟s standard, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).  Accordingly, we must affirm the 
District Court‟s denial of habeas relief unless the PCHA court‟s ruling on Prosdocimo‟s 
due process claim “was so lacking in justification [under existing Supreme Court 
precedent] that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 786-87 (2011).   
Prosdocimo argues that he has met that stringent standard because Rossi‟s 
testimony concerning the plea agreement was false, and due process is violated “when the 
State, although not soliciting false evidence [at trial], allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears.”  Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).  We disagree with his conclusion 
for two reasons.   
As a threshold matter, we reject the characterization of Rossi‟s testimony as “false 
evidence” that the Commonwealth would have an obligation to correct under Napue.  It is 
 9 
 
true that, while under cross-examination that was less than entirely clear, Rossi 
represented he had no immunity from a state prosecution for the McGregor and Pike 
murders.  But he subsequently clarified in the same colloquy that the plea bargain 
“covered [his] prosecution on the Pike and McGregor case[s].”  (J.A. at 442; see J.A. at 
443 (“Like I explained to you before, sir, the only thing I know with regard to the Pike 
and McGregor case[s] is that those two murders I pled guilty under the Ricco [sic] Act, 
and it was my understanding that that covered that.”).)  Because Rossi indicated that his 
RICO plea agreement covered the murders that Prosdocimo contends Rossi falsely 
denied having immunity for, it can fairly be said that there was no false evidence to 
correct under Napue.
4
  Thus, the PCHA court‟s decision was not “contrary to, or … an 
unreasonable application of” Napue.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
But even if we accept Prosdocimo‟s characterization of Rossi‟s testimony as false, 
the PCHA court‟s rejection of Prosdocimo‟s due process claim was not “an error well 
understood and comprehended in [Napue] beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.  Napue, after all, has sometimes been 
treated as a rule pertaining to the introduction of perjured testimony.  See, e.g., Lambert, 
387 F.3d at 242 (“[I]n order to make out a constitutional violation [the petitioner] must 
show that (1) [the witness] committed perjury; (2) the government knew or should have 
                                              
4
 In light of Rossi‟s clarification, his initial misstatements – which can be seen as a 
mere product of confusion – could not have prejudiced Prosdocimo‟s trial.  See Lambert 
v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n order to make out a constitutional 
violation … there [must be a] reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the verdict.”). 
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known of his perjury; (3) the testimony went uncorrected; and (4) there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the verdict.” (emphasis added)).5  
Perjury occurs when a witness “„gives false testimony concerning a material matter with 
the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, 
or faulty memory,‟” United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)), and as Prosdocimo wisely 
concedes, it is “impossible to know” from the record whether Rossi actually committed 
perjury under that standard,
6
 (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 2).   
Because some courts have construed Napue to require perjury to establish a due 
process violation, the PCHA court‟s rejection of Prosdocimo‟s claim on the ground that 
there was no evidence Rossi perjured himself cannot be said to be “contrary to, or … an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,”7 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and habeas relief was 
therefore appropriately denied by the District Court. 
                                              
5
 See also United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To 
establish prosecutorial misconduct for the use of false testimony, a defendant must show 
the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he 
subsequently learned was false testimony… .”); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 509 
(7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Napue does not “require the government to recall [a 
witness] … to clear up any possible confusion when the witness‟s testimony was not 
perjurious”). 
6
 As suggested supra note 4, however, Rossi‟s testimony may have been 
predicated on his confusion concerning the plea agreement‟s terms. 
7
 Prosdocimo correctly observes that some precedent suggests due process can be 
violated under Napue even when the witness does not commit perjury.  See Hayes v. 
Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Napue, by its terms, addresses the 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                  
498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974) (“We do not believe … that the prosecution‟s duty to 
disclose false testimony by one of its witnesses is to be narrowly and technically limited 
to those situations where the prosecutor knows that the witness is guilty of the crime of 
perjury.”).  In at least some factual circumstances, it may be nonsensical to hold 
otherwise.  See Hayes, 399 F.3d at 980-81 (rejecting the State‟s contention that “it is 
constitutionally permissible for it knowingly to present false evidence to a jury in order to 
obtain a conviction, as long as the witness used to transmit the false information is kept 
unaware of the truth”).  However, for the purpose of federal habeas review, the rule of 
law upon which Prosdocimo relies must be “clearly established … as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Prosdocimo‟s claim is 
predicated on Napue, which does not clearly establish that due process can be violated 
even without proof of perjury. 
We reject Prosdocimo‟s contention that a separate Supreme Court case, Mesarosh 
v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), does.  In Mesarosh, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
federal conviction when the Solicitor General advised the Court that he believed “all of [a 
witness‟s] testimony to be untrue.”  Id. at 9.  According to the Court, even if the witness‟s 
testimony did not constitute perjury, “[t]he dignity of the United States Government will 
not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony.”  Id.  For the purposes of 
federal habeas review under § 2254(d)(1), Mesarosh does not establish a clear rule that a 
witness‟s uncorrected untruthfulness – whether perjurious or not – violates due process in 
all circumstances.  Mesarosh, after all, only espoused a principle that a federal conviction 
cannot stand where it is procured based on testimony that is, according to the 
government‟s express representation, untruthful.  Thus, Mesarosh does not establish a 
rule that would necessarily govern under the facts in Prosdocimo‟s case.  See Carey v. 
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2006) (suggesting clearly established federal law consists 
of Supreme Court holdings in cases with materially similar or closely related facts). 
